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The Rise of the Liberal Label 
In 1941 , President Franklin D. Roosevelt defined the differences between 
liberalism and conservatism in the United States thus: 
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Generally speaking, in a representative form of government there arc usually two general 
schools of political belief- liberal and conservative ... The liberal party is a party wh ich 
believes that , as new conditions and problems arise beyond the power of men and women 
to meet as individuals, it becomes the duty of the Government itself to find new remedies 
with which to meet the ... 
The conservative party in government honestly and conscientiously believes the con-
trary. It believes that there is no necessity for the Government to step in, even when new 
conditions and new problems arise. It believes that , in the long run , individual initiative 
and private philanthropy can take care of all situations ... 
The clear and undisputed fact is that in these later yem·s, at least since l 932, the 
Democratic party has been the liberal party, and the Republican party has been the con-
servative party.2 
When Roosevelt made this famous statement he was well aware of the fact 
that not all Republicans were conservatives and not all Democrats were 
liberals. His purpose was not to offer an exhaustive or precise definition of 
the terms, but to evoke a general feeling that the New Deal reforms repre-
sented what he called "true liberalism" and those of his opponents a dis-
credited "conservatism." In Roosevelt's parlance, liberalism was something 
good, and conservatism was bad. His usage of the terms set the standard for 
American political discourse for almost half a century.3 
But Roosevelt's language did not go unchallenged. Particularly during 
the 1930s, there was a fierce struggle over the liberal label , and Roosevelt's 
opponents tried in vain to prevent his usage from becoming the accepted 
one. Herbert Hoover, one of Roosevelt 's most persistent critics, chose "in-
dividualism" as his main ideological label. His chief goal, as the title of 
one of his books indicated, was to protect American Individualism. But 
Hoover also used the words "liberal" and "progressive," and by "liberal" 
he meant individual liberty and opposition to government bureaucracy and 
regulation. In other words , he used "liberal" in the old nineteenth-century 
meaning of the term.4 
The one major label with which Hoover did not want to be identified in 
the 1920s and 1930s was the conservative label, but that is, ironically, the 
2 Quoted in David Green, Sliapi11g Po/i1ical Co11scio11.mess: '/'lie Language of Polilics i11 A111erica ji"Oln 
McKinley /0 Reagan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 119. 
3 Ibid., 119- 120. 
4 Ibid., 95- 118; Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Washington: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library 
Association, 1ul.) . C f. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge , Tlte Right Nation: Conservative Power 
in A111erirn (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 8-9. 
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one he was eventually saddled with and reluctantly accepted , after years of 
resistance. According to historian David Green , Hoover would have pre-
ferred to be called a liberal , but by the early 1940s Franklin Roosevelt and 
the New Dealers had conquered that label and transformed its meaning. 
Roosevelt and his followers succeeded in broadening the popularly accept-
ed meaning of liberal and liberalism to include not just indi vidual freedom 
and property rights but a lso governmental activism and generosity.5 
This important linguistic shift was made possible by various popular New 
Deal policies such as the public works and jobs programs, Social Security, 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and other social reforms, all of which were 
anathema to Herbert Hoover and the conservatives. For Hoover, liberalism 
meant restricting governmental power, whereas for Roosevelt it meant un-
leashing governmental power in combating social ills. In 1945, at the age of 
71, Hoover for the fi rst time grudgingly accepted the designation of "con-
servative" and recommended that the Republicans openly accept that label. 
Being a conservative is "not a sin ," he wrote, noti ng that " lt]he conserva-
tives in America are akin to the nineteenth century liberals of England." But 
the word "liberal" was now useless since it had been "polluted and raped of 
all its real meanings."6 
Today it is bard to fathom how complete the New Dealers' rhetorical 
victory was. ln 1950, li terary critic Lionel Trilling described the s ituation 
thus: "In the United States at this time liberalism is not only the dominant 
but even the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the pl ain fact that nowadays 
there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation ."7 Even 
after the Republican victories in 1952, when the Party recaptured the White 
House and won a majority of the seats in Congress, liberalism as an intel-
lectual and politi cal doctrine continued to reign supreme. 
To the chagrin of its conservative supporters, President Dwight E isen-
hower's administration ( 1953-61) did not try to undo the New Deal reforms 
5 Compare the word "folkheni'' (people's home) in Sweden, which originally was used mostly hy conserva-
tives but which the Social Democrats in the 1920s and 1930s managed to conquer and tnmsform. Erik 
Asard and W. Lance Bennell, Democracy and the Marketplace of Ideas: Co111mr111iclllio11 tmd Govem111e111 
i11 Sweden and tire United Srnres (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 91-98. 
6 Green, Slwpi11g Polirical Co11scia11s11ess, 162 (quote): Paul Levine and Harry Papasotiriou,America since 
1945: 'Ore American Mome/11 (New York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2005) . I 0-13. 
7 George H. Nash. Tlie Cmr.rerwrrive //l/ellec11m/ Moveme/11 in America Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 
1979), 58. Cf. Louis Hanz, The liberal 'fradirio11 i11 America: An illterpretario11 '!f American Polirical 
Tlwught Since tire Revolwio11 (New York: Harcourt Brace .Jovanovich , 1955). 
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or dis mantle the welfare state , nor did it try to roll back communism in Eu-
rope. Instead, Social Security and une mployment benefits in creased and the 
budget deficit sky-rocketed. "Should any political party attempt to abolish 
Social Security and eliminate labor laws and farm programs , you would not 
hear of that party again in our political history," Eisenhower told his more 
conservative brother Edgar.8 For the conservatives, Daniel Bell later wrote, 
"eight years of moderation proved more fru strating than twenty years of 
opposition."9 Lyndon Johnson 's landslide victory over the right's standard-
bearer Barry Goldwater in 1964, followed by the launch of the Great So-
c iety programs and the enactment of the civil rights legis lation, seemed to 
confirm the dominance of liberalism and the marginalization of the right. 
"These, without doubt, are the years of the liberal," economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith mused in 1.964. "Almost everyone now so describes himself." 10 
The Fall of the Liberal Label 
In retrospect , however, the 1964 presidential election was not as disastrous 
for conservatives as many liberal commentators thought at the time. True , 
Barry Goldwater suffered a major defeat , but he also managed to extend the 
Republican Party's support in the South , the Southwest, and the West and 
thereby lay the foundation for the conservative ascendancy in the 1970s 
and 1980s . Further, he energized over 600,000 people to make financial 
contributions and some four million to take an active part in his campaign. 
Thousands of his precinct workers later became officials in the resurgent 
conservative movement. Jn addition, Goldwater 's campaign helped launch 
the political career of Ronald Reagan. Those are a couple of the reasons 
why some analysts have called the 1964 election a "watershed in the history 
of American conservatis m." 11 
8 Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 7/ie Nig/11 Na tion, 4 1 (quote); Levine & Papasotiriou, America since 1945 , 
59-7 l. 
9 Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed (1962)," in Daniel Bell , ed., 71re l?adical /light (New Brunswick: Transac-
tion Publishers, third edition. 2002 , with a new introduction by David Plotke), 3. The book was originally 
published in 1955 under the title Tire New America11 l?ight. Sec also Erik Asard , Hillary Rod/ram Clilllun: 
En politi.l'k bioxrafi (Lund: Histo riska Media, 2008). 89. 
10 Micklethwait & Wooldridge, '/1re Hight Nation, 9. 
11 Alf Tomas T!'!nnessen. "Conservatives for C hange: I low Richard Viguerie and Paul Weyrich Helped Or-
ganize, Fund, and Empower the American Right Wing. 1964-198 1" (Dissertation for the Ph.D. degree in 
humanities, Department of Literature, Area Studies , and European Languages , University of Oslo, 2008) , 
48-49 (quote on 49); Asan.l, Hillary /lodlwm Cli111on, 90 . On the 1964 e lection campaign, sec also Robert 
THE STIGMAT IZATION OF THE LIBERAL LABEL 27 
The Republicans have won 7 of the 11 presidential elections since J 968, 
and they kept control of Congress for most of the ti me between J 995 and 
2006. These changes do not only reflect a shift in the power relationship be-
tween the two main political parties. They are also the resu lt of a purpose-
ful transformation of the American political language. This transformation 
involves key words such as values, elite, government, class, and bias, all 
of which have been given a new meaning or interpretation that generally 
implies a conservative point of view. The people behind this linguistic cam-
paign, according to linguist Geoffrey Nunberg, are a number of conserva-
tives and Republican party operatives who "have managed to move the cen-
ter of gravity of the language itself to the right- not just on the right-wing 
talk shows, but even in the mainstream media." 12 
"Conservatives seem to have a genius for winning the all-important 
semantic battles," journalist Richard Goodwin wrote presciently in 1967. 
There are many examples of this-anti-union laws become "right to work," 
opposition to a woman 's right to choose becomes "right to life," national 
health insurance becomes "socialized medicine," same-sex marriage be-
comes "gay marriage," and so on .13 
Perhaps the best example of the change is the stigmati zation of the word 
liberaL. In the 1960s, most liberal politicians had no qualms owning up to the 
label. For example, John F. Kennedy spoke eloquently about the term mean-
ing "someone who cares about the welfare of the people-their health, their 
housing, their schools , their jobs, their civil rights , and their civil liberties."14 
But today, "liberal" has become a feared or dirty word that few politicians, 
including those on the left, use as a self-designation. All the recent Demo-
cratic candidates for president, from Bi ll Clinton to Barack Obama, have run 
away from it , disclaimed it, or tried to distance themselves from it , prefer-
ring to use other labels such as "New Democrat," "centiist," "moderate," or 
Alan Goldberg, Barry Goldwarer (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1995), 181 -237, and Nie ls Bjcrrc-
Poulsen, Right Face: Orgn11izi11g rite A111erica11 Conservative Move111e111 1945-65 (Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press , 2002), 261 -289. 
12 Geoffrey Nunberg. Talking Right: I low Conservatives Titmed Li/Jeralis111 /1110 a Tax-Raisi11g, Lotte-Dri11k-
ing. Sus/ti-Eating, Volvo-Driving, New York Times-Reading, Body-l'ierci11g, Hollywood-Lovi11g, Left· Wing 
Freak Shaw (New York: Public Affairs, 2006). quote on the dust jacket. Nun berg is a linguist at the School 
of Information of the University of Ca lifornia at Berkeley. 
13 Sam Tanenhaus, "A Once-Un ited G.O.P. Emerges, in Identity Crisis," New York Tr mes. November 5, 2008. 
Cf. George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Eleplumt/ Know Your Values a11d Frame rite Debate (White River 
Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing. 2004) . 
14 http://<lickpol man .blogspol .com/2007 /07 /democrats-aml-box-popu Ii .ht ml. 
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(the cunent favorite) "progressive." During the 2004 presidential campaign , 
John Keny not only refused to call himself a liberal , which in fact he is; in 
a failed attempt to placate his opponents and reassure voters that he wasn't 
some suspicious foreign individual who preferred French wine and food, 
Kerry claimed that he was the real candidate of conservative values. All of 
which made him an easy target of Republican attacks and ridicule. 15 
At the margins , this development has led to the publication of odd book 
titles such as Deliver Us from Evil: Defeating Terrorism, Despotism and 
Liberalism and Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the Wi:zr 
on Terrorism. 16 But it has also infected the political mainstream. In Jul y of 
2007, dming one of many televised debates between the Democratic can-
didates for president, Hillary Rodham Clinton was asked how she would 
define the word "liberal" and whether she would use the term to describe 
herself. This was her answer: 
It is a word that o riginally meant that you were for freedom, that you 
were for the freedom to achieve, that you were willing to stand against 
big power and on behalf of the individual. Unfortunately, in the last 30, 40 
years, it has been turned up on its head ... I prefer the term "progress ive," 
which has a real American meaning ... So I consider myself a proud mod-
ern American progressive. 17 
In other words, at least to Hillary Clinton , the word "liberal" does not 
seem to have a " real American meaning" anymore. Today, it has almost 
acquired an un-American connotation, as dated and useless as "conserva-
tive" was half a century ago. Liberal politicians have not abandoned the lib-
eral world view, or their support for liberal-leaning programs, but nowadays 
they are much more likely to describe themselves as "progressives," a more 
appealing but also vaguer term. Barack Obama is another case in point. He 
has also distanced himself from the liberal label , considering it part of the 
"old politics" that he wants to change. In his book The Audacity of Hope , 
Obama repeatedly uses the term "we progressives" to refer to himself and 
his followers. 18 
I 5 Nunberg, Talking Right , 109; Micklcthwail & Wooldridge, The Right Nm ion. 41 3. 
16 Sean Hannity, Deliver U.1·from Evil: Defeatini: Terrorism, Despotism and Ubern/i.1·m (New York: Regan 
Books, 2004); Ann Coulter, Treason: Liberal Treocl1eryfro1111/ie Cold War 10 the War 011 Terrorism (Crown 
Forum, 2003). 
I 7 http://dickpolman.blogspot.com/2007/07/democrats-11nd-box-populi.html. I added the italics. 
I 8 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope : T'1011g'11.1· 011 Reclaimi11i: the America n Dream (New York: Three 
Rivers Press, 2006), 2 13-216 (quote on 2 I G). 
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The last time a Democratic candidate for president used the liberal label 
was in 1988, when Governor Michael Dukakis , defensively and belatedly 
(in fact , just a few days before the election), confessed that he was a liberal 
in the tradition of Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy, this after George Bush 
senior had attacked him in a series of poli tical ads for being soft on crime 
and lacking in patriotism during the 1988 election campaign. It was dur-
ing the 1988 campaign thilt Ronald Reagan proclaimed to the Republican 
National Convention: "The masquerade is over. It's time to ... say the 
dreaded L-word ; to say [thatJ the policies of our opposition are liberal , lib-
eral, liberal." From then on the liberal label, once so proud and signifying 
the Democratic Party's proudest achievements in government, would be 
branded as the unspeakable "L-word." 19 
By contrast , many of today's Republicans have followed Herbert Hoover's 
recommendation and proudly refer to themselves as conservatives. In the 
2008 primary campajgn for the Republican nomination for president, vir-
tually all the leading GOP candidates competed for the conservative label 
and portrayed themselves as the true he ir to Ronald Reagan , including for-
mer moderates such as Rudy Giuliani and Mitt Romney. Even John Mc-
Cain, who has a reputation for being a reform-minded maverick , repeatedly 
stressed his conservative credentials and stated that he was "very proud to 
have come to publ ic office as a foot soldier in the Reagan Revolution."20 
This shift to the right among the Republican leadership and party activists 
refl ects the fact that over the last decades, the number of people willing 
to identify themselves as liberals has gone down to 22 percent, whereas 
34 percent now describe themselves as conservatives; the rest (44 percent) 
claim that they are moderates or centrists.2 1 
What does this transformation of the American political language mean? 
First of all , it means that by alte ring the meaning of their opponent's ma in 
ideological label , the Republi cans have won an important rhetorical victory 
19 Nunbcrg, Talking Rig/rt, 43. Cf. Gerald M. Pumper e l al., Tile EleC1io11of1988: Reporrs and l111erpre1n1io11s 
(Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1989), 65, 82, 87, 94; Erik Asard. Den ko11.\'erva1iva era11: Ameri-
kansk politikfilm l?eaga11 till 811sil (Uppsala: Uppsala North American Studies Reports #7, 199 1), 66-72. 
20 Sasha lssenbcrg, ''McCain touts conservative record," Tile Bos/011 Globe, February 8. 2008. For a cri tical 
study of how the U.S. media have covered McCain. see David Brock and Paul Waldman. Free Ride: John 
McCain mul tile Media (New York: Anchor Books , 2008). 
21 Robert G. Kaiser. " Po llslcrs Debate America's Political Realignmenl," Wa.1"'1ing1011 Post , November 23, 
2008. The fi gures come from the 2008 National Election exjt poll of 17,836 randomly selected voters . Cf. 
Nunberg, 'li:llking Right, 42. 
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not unlike the one achieved by Roosevelt and the New Dealers during the 
1930s. If your main label gets so contaminated that you can no longer use 
it or be associated with it, you are at an enormous communication disad-
vantage. Imagine the Tories in Great Britain not be ing able to use "conser-
vatism" as their self-designation , or the Swedish Social Democrats having 
to disassociate themselves from the concept of the "welfare state." 22 Many 
of the grand words used in today 's political discourse are old and dated , but 
they are still important in conveying the values of a candidate or a party. 
Those who are able to shape the publicly accepted meaning of key terms 
have a distinct rhetorical advantage. 
Second, by not wanting to own up to being liberals, liberal Democrats 
nm the risk of distancing themselves from ordinary voters, many of whom 
still use the "L-word" as a point of reference when talking about politics. 
Thus, the divide threatens to grow even greater between ordinary people 
and the political elite. In a populist political culture such as the American 
one, anything that puts you in the camp of elitists is bad. Third , by disown-
ing the Liberal label the Democrats haven' tjust lost a label - they have lost a 
whole narrative , the New Deal refonn era narrative which they were able to 
capitalize on politically for so long. In politics , it has always been important 
to have a compelling narrative, one which voters can relate to and which 
can be used for launching policies for the future. If you lack such a narra-
tive, you leave the field open for your opponents to fill in the blanks. 
The Right Turn in U.S. Politics 
The decline of the liberal label may seem strange considering that the Un it-
ed States is still often referred to as a "liberal democracy." Indeed, classical 
liberalism is one of the key ingredients in the intellectual heritage of the 
nation . Both the Constitution and the formation of the early Republic were 
highly influenced by renowned liberal thinkers such as John Locke and 
James Madison. "The revolutionary ideology which became the American 
Creed is liberali sm in its eighteenth- and nineteenth-century meanings," 
22 The Swedish Social Democrats face a different rhetorical dilemma than the U.S. Democrats . Since all po-
litical part ies in Sweden nowadays speak approvingly of the welfare state, the term is uncontroversial and 
has lost much of its former specific meaning. Whereas the U.S. Democrats are suffering from a rhetorical 
destruction. the Swedish Social Dcnwcrats have to deal with the problems of rhetorical i.mitation. Erik 
Asard , "Liberalen stamplad som freak," Dagen.1· Nyhete1; January 14, 2007. 
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writes Seymour Martin Lipset.23 Since that time , however, the meaning of 
liberal and liberalism in the United States has changed at least twice. Such 
shifts in language have occurred quite frequently in American history, and 
they are usually connected with changes in public attitudes and in changing 
political and social environments. 
The first transformation I have already mentioned- it began during the 
Progressive era and was completed during the New Deal , when the mean-
ing of liberal changed from an emphasis on individualism and property 
rights to government-sponsored social welfare programs. The second shift 
is closely connected with the right turn in U.S. politics wh ich began in the 
1960s and 1970s, after the c.i vil rights legislation was passed, making the 
Republicans the dominant party in the South and leading to the subsequent 
unraveling of the New Deal coalition. It was a highly complex confluence 
of events which involved the white backlash to the c ivi l rights laws, the 
deep divisions over the Vietnam War, the Great Society programs, abortion, 
women 's rights, gay rights, and affirmative action. Controversies over tax 
rates, welfare spending, and "stagflation" were other contributing factors. 
"OPEC, the Ayatollahs in Iran, and skyrocketing crime rates also did their 
part to further deepen the crisis of American liberalism."24 
To quote James Sundquist, a social scie ntist: 
In the public's perception , all these things merged. Ghetto riots , campus riots, street 
crime, anti-Vietnam marches, poor people 's marches, drugs, pornography, welfarism , 
rising taxes, all had a common thread: the breakdown of family and social discipline, of 
order, of concepts of duty, of respect for law, of public and private rnorality.2·1 
And Peter Beinart, a journalist: 
Traditional liberalism died .. . because Americans-who had once associated it with 
order-came to associate it with disorder instead. For a vast swath of the white work ing 
class, racial freedom came to mean riots and crime; sexual freedom ca.int: tu 11 1t:a11 ui -
vorce; and cultural freedom came to mean disrespect for family, church and flag. Richard 
23 Seymour Martin Lipset, A111eriw11 Exceptio11alis111: A Double-Ecl!iecl Sword (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company. t 996), 31. Cf. Gordon S. Wood. The /\111erica11 Revo/11tio11: A His10ry (New York: A Modern 
Library Chronicles Book, 2003). 59-62: James A. Moronc, //el!Jire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American 
Histo1y (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 5-7, 31-33. 
24 Bjerre-Poulsen, Right F"ce, 296. Cf. Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers. Ri!iht Tum: The Decline of the 
De111ocro1s and the Future of /\111erica11 Politics (New York: I Ji ll and Wang, t 986). 
25 Quoted in Jonathan Rieder, "The Rise of the 'Silent Majority,"' in Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle, eds .. 1'l1e 
Rise a11d Fall o/1/1e New Deal Order, 1930- 1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1989), 257. 
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Nixon and later Reagan won the presidency by promising a new order: not economic bllt 
cultural , not the taming of the market but the taming of the street.26 
Now the meaning of liberalism was broadened once again , this time to in-
clude not just statism and social welfare programs but also waves of pro-
tests and demonstrations, sexual permissiveness, and alternative ways of 
living. Through a skillful use of books, magazines, think tanks, talk radio 
and other media, the Republicans and their conservative supporters were 
able to link liberalism to these developments, to somehow make liberals 
responsible for the excesses of the 1960s and 1970s and thereby move the 
political discourse to the right. This was not accomplished easi ly or quick-
ly; it took years of intense political debate and propaganda before the effect 
was fully evident. The result , as we know, is that in a country which prides 
itself on being seen as the cradle of liberal democracy, the word liberal has 
nowadays been reduced to a pejorative. 
The Democrats' fear of the liberal label has pushed the meaning of it to the 
political margins. According to Geoffrey Nunberg, " [tlhere was a time when 
liberal and leftist were contrasting terms; now the right tends to use them in-
terchangeably." Ali of which has created a vicious rhetorical circle: "the more 
Democrats shun the liberal label, the easier it is for the right to demonize it, 
making Democrats even more reluctant to wear it than before."27 
Barack Obama and the Future of the Liberal Label 
Will Barack Obama and his new administration make a difference in this re-
gard? That remains to be seen , but my sense is that liberals in the U.S. have 
pretty much given up on the liberal label , and that the new president has no 
intention of re-fighting old semantic battles. For a ll the eloquence displayed 
by Barack Obama during and after the 2008 presidential campaign, he has 
not shown any interest in reviving the liberal label, nor has he come up with 
a new slogan of similar stature and resonance. "Yes , we can" is a catchy 
phrase, but no substitute for a comprehensive governing vision. 
26 Peter Beina1t , "The New Liberal Order," 'lime, November 24, 2008, 25. Cf. Rick Pe rlstein, Nixon/and: Tlie 
Ri.l'e of a Preside/I/ and the Fracturing of America (New York: Scribner, 2008), passim. See also Thomas 
Frank. W/1m:, the Matter with Kamas? How Co11servatille.\· IV011 tl1e Heart of America (New York: Henry 
Holr and Company, 2004). 
27 Nunberg, 7iilki11;: Rig/11, 46 f. 
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Barack Obama's Inaugural Address on January 20, 2009, is instructive 
in this regard . In his speech Obama presented a standard liberal view of 
government's role in a modern society. Unlike Ronald Reagan, who in 1981 
proclaimed that government was the problem and not the solution , Obama 
suggested that government and markets both are needed to make society 
work. In a passage which can also be seen as a late rejoinder to Bill Clin-
ton 's 1996 announcement that "the era of big government is over," Obama 
stated, "The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big 
or too small, but whether it works , whether it helps fami lies find jobs at a 
decent wage , care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified." 
Obama continued: 
Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power lo 
generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched . But this crisis has reminded us that 
without a watchful eye , the market can spin out of control. The nation cannot prosper 
long when it favors only the prospcrous.28 
This part of the speech , which clearl y illustrates Oba ma's pragmatism, was 
an attempt to move the discussion beyond the ideological battles of the 
1980s and 1990s. Missing from Obama 's address, Timothy Garton Ash not-
ed, "was only the proper name of the political philosophy, coded into the 
constitutional DNA of the United States, that proposes this and other bal-
ances: liberalism." In substance, the Inaugural Address presented "a blend 
of classical constitutional and modern egalitarian liberalism. The thing, but 
never the word." The reason for thi s omission was of course that liberal-
ism in America has become a fo ul term denoting - in Garton Ash 's colorfu l 
wording- "some unholy marriage of big govern ment and forni cation."29 
Obama 's pragmatism and focus on achieving results lead him to eschew 
traditional ideological labels. Some of the president's liberal supporrers 
have been unhappy with hi s lack of ideological clarity and would want him 
to fully embrace the liberal label. Surveying Obama's firs t weeks in office, 
Leon Wieseltier was discouraged with the new administration's "reluctance 
to attach the grandeur of its initiatives to the grandeur of liberalism. Instead 
the president's distaste for divis ion, and his Chicago practicality, set the 
tone." Wieseltier wanted the president to public ly declare "that the values 
28 Barack Obama's inaugural Address." The New York Ti111es. January 20. 2009. 
29 Timothy Garton Ash, "A Liberal Translation," The New York "/i111es,January 25, 2009 . 
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of liberalism and the values of conservatism are not the same values, even 
if compromises may be cobbled together; and that there is dignity in the 
contradictions ."30 
However, saying so would probably be too confrontational for a president 
who ran on a platform of post-parti sanship and who throughout his career 
has demonstrated that he favors compromise over combat. But Obama's 
platform and his first months in office raise the question of whether he has 
any coherent political philosophy to guide his actions. Here it may be in-
structive to compare him with Franklin Roosevelt, who also took office in 
the midst of a severe economic crisis without having a clearly articulated 
governing philosophy. FDR had run on a promise to balance the budget, 
reduce taxes and try new solutions until something worked. "The country 
needs , and unless I mistake its temper, the country demands, persistent ex-
perimentation ," Roosevelt stated duri ng the 1932 campaign. "It is common 
sense to take a method and try it. If it fails , admit it frankly and try another. 
But above al l, try something."31 
Roosevelt had promised action and experimentation , but there was no 
overriding philosophy tying the various ideas together. Frances Perkins, 
FDR's Secretary of Labor and the first woman ever to serve in a U.S . cabi-
net, later confirmed this. "The notion that the New Deal had a preconceived 
theoretical position is ridiculous," Perkins said. "The pattern it was to as-
sume was not clear or specific in Roosevelt's mind, in the mind of the Dem-
ocratic party, or in the mind of anyone else."32 Not until 1936 did Roosevelt 
run on a full- fl edged New Deal plalform. 
Barack Obama is similar to Roosevelt in his focus on action and in his 
unwillingness to subscribe to a fixed ideological position. Whether he is 
also interested in " persistent experimentation" is still unclear. For now, no 
one knows what Obama's equivalent to the New Deal will be. Perhaps it 
will emerge gradually as he grapples with the economic and financial crisis, 
the energy problem, health care, and so on. As political philosopher Mi-
chael Sandel said after Obama's victory, "These challenges are so great that 
he will only succeed if he is able to articulate a new politics of the common 
good."33 
30 Leon Wieseltier. "Washington Diarist: Love Me I'm A Lihcral." The New Republic. March 4, 2009. 
3 1 Asard & llennett, Democracy will the Mnrketplnce of Ideas , 56. 
32 Russell Baker, "A Revolutionary President ." '/1/e New York Review of Books, February 12-25, 2009, 6. 
33 Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Finishing Amcricu's work," /111ematio11a/ f-lernld 'frib1111e, Nov. 6, 2008 , 15. 
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Obama is not the first president who has come to power promising to 
change the ways of Washington politics. Facing him is an opposition which 
likes to call itseff "loyal ," but which seems more interested in obstruction 
than in cooperation. Obama's initial economic stimulus package passed 
without any Republican support in the House of Representatives , and with 
just three Republicans voting for it in the Senate. This was an early indica-
tion of the daunting task facing the new president. 
In general, it seems as if Democrats are more inclined to work with Re-
publicans than the other way around . This fact may well be rooted in their 
ideological differences, as Alan Wolfe suggests in his recent book , The 
Future of Liberalism. Conservati ves, he argues, like to stand on principle, 
whereas liberal s are more action-oriented and like to get things done.34 If 
that is the case, Obama's opponents are not likely to lay down their arms, 
and unlikely to be swayed by his call for bipartisanship and cooperation. 
Above all , it is worth remembering that even with an extremely unpopu-
lar incumbent president, a deep economic cris is and the U.S. engaged in 
two wars abroad, John McCain managed to get almost 46 percent of the 
vote in the 2008 presidential election. The conservative network of advo-
cacy groups, think tanks, and media outlets is still there, eager to continue 
the trashing of liberalism and the liberal label. Barack Obama's historic and 
impressive victory notwithstanding , his party's rhetorical dilemma is not 
likely to disappear anytime soon. 
34 Alan Wolfe , '/11e Future <~f Liberalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2009). 
